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Abstract
The present study investigates the price dynamics of two agricultural commodities, pork and
poultry, in order to determine whether there is a single or multiple markets within the EU.
The investigation relies on the notion of a price club (meaning a group of countries in which
prices obey the LOP) and on a clustering algorithm which allows for endogenous selection of
such clubs. Overall, the empirical results indicate that the EU markets for pork and poultry
are far from the ideal ones in which prices are uniform.
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1.  Introduction 
The analysis of spatial price relationships has been long used in economics to assess  
the  functioning  (integration)  of  geographically  separated  markets.  When  goods  and 
information flow freely among them, shocks occurring in one market will evoke responses in 
other markets. Arbitrage activities will ensure that price differences of homogeneous goods in 
separated locations will be, at most, equal to transportation costs. However, when localized 
markets  are  not  well  integrated,  profitability  opportunities  will  not  be  fully  exploited 
resulting, thus, into efficiency losses (e.g. Asche et al., 1999; Serra et al., 2006).  
  This study investigates the spatial relationships of pork and of poultry prices in 14 EU 
countries  in  order  to  determine  whether  there  is  a  single  EU  market  or  multiple  markets 
within  the  EU  for  these  two  agricultural  commodities.  Stigler  (1969)  and  Sutton  (1991) 
defined  market  as  an  area  in  which  the  prices  are  uniform,  allowances  being  made  for 
transportation  costs  and/or  quality  differences.  Geographically  separated  markets  form  a 
single market when price differences or price ratios for those markets remain stable over time. 
Stable price differences around zero or equivalently, stable price ratios around unity offer 
evidence  in  favor  of  the  strong  version  of  the  Law  of  One  Price  (LOP);  stable  price 
differences  around non  zero constants or equivalently, stable price ratios around different 
from unity constants offer evidence in favor of the weak version of the LOP (e.g. Asche et al., 
1999; Robinson, 2007; Sosvilla-Rivero and Gil-Pareja, 2004). Borrowing terminology from 
the literature on asymptotic stochastic convergence (e.g. Bernard and Durlauf, 1995 and 1996;  
Goldberg and Verboren, 2005; Hobijn and Franses, 2000) one may call localized markets in 
which the LOP holds a price club (price cluster). For a single EU market all localized markets 
must be members of the same price club; multiple markets within the EU are consistent with 
the existence of multiple price clubs. The price clubs in this work are identified endogenously 
through a clustering algorithm which relies on the empirical values of statistics suitable for 
testing the LOP restrictions in cointegrating vectors.  
Price dynamics in the  EU members is  an issue of  great  concern and  the focus of 
intense public debate. Survey evidence from supermarkets around the Union suggests that 
“Border still seems to matter in Europe” , “The EU remains divided into 15 separate markets 
for supermarket goods, where prices in neighboring countries are not much related” (Internal 
Market Scoreboard, 2001 and 2004). Despite the importance of the topic there is a scarcity of 
formal studies on spatial price interrelationships for agricultural commodities in the EU. To 
the best of knowledge, the only earlier works have been those by Sanjuan and Gil (2001), 
Serra et al. (2006), and Zanias (1993).  None of them, however, has explored the possibility of 
different  price  clubs  to  exist  in  the  internal  European  market.  Traditionally  the  EU 
policymakers have intervened less in the pork and the poultry markets relative to those of 
other  livestock  products  such  as  beef  meat,  lamb  meet,  and  milk.  The  rather  limited 
intervention creates a favorable environment for a smooth price transmission process across 
space.  Zanias  (1993)  provided  empirical  evidence  that  a  high  degree  of  intervention  is 
associated with a low degree of integration in the long term. At the same time, both the pork 
and the poultry industry in the EU exhibit high levels of concentration. As noted by Sexton et 
al. (1991) market power can be an impediment to full price transmission. Therefore, with 
respect  to  the  price  dynamics,  the  pork  and  the  poultry  markets  in  the  EU  present  more 
interest relative to the markets of other livestock commodities. In what follows, section 2 
contains  the  analytical  framework,  section  3  the  empirical  results,  while  section  4  offers 








2. Analytical Framework 
Let  us  denote  the  natural  logarithms  of  the  I(1)  prices  of  the  same  good  in  the 
geographically separated markets i and j and in time t by  i
t p  and  j
t p , respectively. For the 
weak version of the LOP to hold it must be the case that  
 




t p p ε β + + = , 
 
where  0 ≠ β  is a constant and t ε  is a zero-mean stationary  error term (e.g. Asche et al., 
1999).  In  other  words,  i
t p   and  j
t p   must  be  cointegrated  variables  with  cointegrating 
parameters (1, -1, -β). When (1) is true,  
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implying that at every moment of time we expect the natural logarithms of prices to differ by 
β no matter what are the current and past price levels. For the strong version of the LOP to 
hold it must be the case that  




t p p ε + = .  
In other words,  i
t p  and  j
t p , must be cointegrated variables with cointegrating parameters (1, 
-1, 0). When (3) is true, 
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suggesting that at every moment in time we expect the prices to be equal, no matter what are 
the  current  and  past  price  levels.  Cointegration  of  two  I(1)  price  series  is  a  necessary 
condition for the LOP (weak or strong version) to hold. It is not, however, sufficient. To see it 
notice that if the coefficient of  j
t p  in (1) was  1 ≠ γ , the price difference could be written as  






t p p p ε β γ + + − = −  
The  Right  Hand  Side  of  (5)  is  now  non  stationary  suggesting  that  stochastic  shocks  to 
logarithmic differences persist into indefinite future (that means, the LOP does not hold).
1  
  The Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) (Johansen, 1988; Johansen and Juselius, 
1990) has been extensively used to study spatial price linkages (e.g. Asche et al., 1999; Gosh, 
2003; Sanjuan and Gil, 2001).  If  t P  denotes a (nx1) vector of I(1) logarithmic prices the 
VECM may be written as 
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where  φ Γ   and  * Π   are  parameter  matrices,  and  *
k t P −   is  the  price  vector  in  period  t-k 
augmented by 1. In particular,  
                                                 
1 Notice that (2) and (4), respectively,  are the conditions for asymptotically relative and asymptotically perfect 
stochastic convergence  of two time series (e.g. Bernard and Durlauf, 1995 and 1996; Proietti, 2005). This 




































    and  )' 1 , , .... , , .... , ( 1
*
k nt k it k t k t p p p P − − − − = .    The  rank  of  * Π , 
denoted by r, determines how may linear of combinations of prices are stationary.  When 
n r < < 0  there exist r cointegrating vectors and one can factor  * Π  as  ' * ρ a = Π  with abeing 
a (nxr) matrix of the adjustment parameters and  ρ  being a ((n+1)xr) matrix containing the 
error-correcting mechanism of the system. In VECM model presented in (6) the constants  i β , 
(i=1, 2, …, n) have been included in the cointegrating vectors to test for the strong version of 
the LOP. Technically, inclusion of constants in a cointegrating vector is allowed when none 
of the series exhibits a linear deterministic trend. Tests for the presence of linear deterministic 
trend in the pork  and the poultry price series  are carried out in section 3 using the  βτ τ  
statistic (Enders, 1995).       
   The number of cointegrating vectors can be determined using the Trace and the Max 
tests (Johansen and Juselious, 1990). A necessary condition for the weak version of the LOP 
to  hold  is  that  the  rank  of  * Π   is  n-1  suggesting  that  the  n  prices  series  are  pairwise 
cointegrated or equivalently, that they share a single common stochastic trend (Stock and 
Watson, 1988). The sufficient condition is that the (n-1)x(n+1) matrix  ' ρ  of the cointegrating 
vectors can be written as 
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implying n-1 restrictions on the price-related parameters. The weak version of the LOP, in 
turn, is a necessary condition for the strong version of the LOP. The sufficient condition is 
that (7) can be written as   
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= ρ  
implying  2(n-1)  restrictions  on  the  price-related  parameters  and  the  constants.  The  test 
statistic for restrictions on the elements of cointegrating vectors are  













i λ  and  R
i λ  are the eigenvalues from the unrestricted and the restricted matrix  * Π , 
respectively. These statistics follow the Chi-squared distribution with degrees of freedom the 
number of restrictions (Johansen and Juselius, 1990).   
  Since the weak version of the LOP is a necessary (but not a sufficient) condition for 
the strong version of the LOP it appears reasonable to identify first price clubs where the 
weak version of the LOP holds and then to search for price clubs where the strong version of 




algorithm for the endogenous selection of clubs where the weak version of the LOP holds 
may be summarized as: 
(1) at the initial stage each localized market represents a separate (single-member)  
price club; thus, there are n such clubs  n i i Ci ....., , 2 , 1 , = = ; 
(2) compute the empirical value of the test statistic for the weak version of the LOP 
for each possible pair of markets [i, j] , i<j and obtain the corresponding p-value 
(denoted as  ] , [ j i p ) from the table of the Chi-squared distribution with 1 degree of 
freedom;  
(3) if max ( ] , [ j i p ) is less than 0.05, stop and conclude that all clubs consist of only 
one member; else choose the pair [i, j] for which  ] , [ j i p  is maximum; 
(4) combine clusters  i C and  j C ; 
(5) iterate (2)-(4) until ] , [ j i p  is less than 0.05 or until all localized markets belong to a 
single club; the ] , [ j i p  when combining club i with  i k  members and club j with 
j k members  is  obtained  from  the  tables  of  the  Chi-squared  distribution  with 
1 − + j i k k degrees of freedom. 
Given that  t P  consists of logarithmic prices, prices in countries which belong to a price club 
where the weak version of the LOP holds maintain (on average) a proportional relation to 
each other over time.     
The structure of the clustering algorithm for the endogenous selection of clubs where 
the strong version of the LOP holds (which is applied to each club where the weak version of 
the LOP holds) is the same as that described above. The only difference is that the  ] , [ j i p  for 
testing  the  strong  version  of  the  LOP  is  obtained  from  the  tables  of  the  Chi-squared 
distribution with  ) 1 ( 2 − + j i k k degrees of freedom. The algorithm tests for both the necessary 
and the sufficient conditions for the LOP, it does not depend on the ordering of the price 
series  and  it  is  consistent  (that  means,  it  finds  true  price  clubs  when  enough  data  are 
available).
2  Prices differences in countries which belong to a club where the strong version of 
the LOP are (on average) zero over time.  
 
3. The Empirical Results 
    The data for the empirical analysis are monthly price series from 14 EU countries 
over the period 1995:1 to 2006:6.  The countries are Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Germany 
(DE), Denmark (DK), Spain (ES), Finland (FI), France (FR), Greece (GR), Ireland (IR), Italy 
(IT), the Netherlands (NE), Portugal (PT), Sweden (SE), and the United Kingdom (UK). The 
prices,  which  are  expressed  in  Euro/100  kg,  are  those  received  by  producers  at  the 
slaughterhouse and they have been obtained from the European Commission (2007). Tables 1 
and 2 presents descriptive statistics. With regard to pork, the highest prices (on average) have 
been recorded in Greece and in Italy and the lowest in the Netherlands and in Denmark. With 
regard to poultry, the highest prices (on average) have been recorded in Greece and in Finland 
and the lowest in the Netherlands and in Spain. 
  Prior to the application of the clustering algorithm, the natural logarithms of price 
series have been tested for the presence of linear deterministic trend using the  βτ τ  statistic. 
                                                 
2 Alternative clustering algorithms have been proposed in the literature. The algorithm by Hobijn and Franses 
(2000) utilizes multivariate stationarity tests on the difference of time series, while that by Proietti (2005) 




For the pork prices series, the empirical values of that statistic ranged from a low of –0.904 
for FR to a high of 0.10 for ES; for the poultry price series, they ranged from a low of –0.62 
for NE to a high of 1.37 for SE. With 5 percent critical values of –(+) 2.79 the null hypothesis 
(deterministic  trend  is  not  present)  cannot  be  rejected  for  any  of  the  28  price  series. 
Subsequently, the presence of unit roots in the series has been tested using the DFGLS test by 
Elliot et al. (1996). For pork prices, the empirical values of the test statistic ranged from a low 
of –1.81 for FR to a high of –0.85 for the UK. With a 5 percent critical value of –1.945 the 
null hypothesis (stochastic trend is present) cannot be rejected for any of the 14 pork price 
series. For poultry prices the null hypothesis has been rejected for GR (empirical value –
2.71), for SE (empirical value –2.11), and for the UK (empirical value –2.25). Non stationary 
and stationary series cannot be mixed. Therefore, GR, SE, and the UK do not belong to the 
same price club (for poultry) with any of the remaining countries. Whether GR, SE, and the 
UK can form a club where the strong version of the LOP holds will be investigated using LS 
regressions and standard tools of inference on parameter restrictions.
3  Finally, for the I(1) 
series  the  aggregation  algorithm  has  been  applied  only  to  groups  of  localized  markets  in 
which  the  price  logarithms  are  pairwise  cointegrated  since  pairwise  cointegration  is  a 
necessary condition for LOP (weak or strong version).
 4 
  Table 3 presents the aggregation history of the clustering algorithm in the search for 
pork price clubs where the weak version of the LOP holds. In square brackets the clusters that 
are formed at each iteration are reported; l C  refers to the club formed in the lth iteration (for 
instance, at iteration 4 AT is added to the cluster comprising DK, PT, DE, and ES).
5 There are 
four such clubs. The first consists of seven members (DK, PT, DE, ES, AT, GR, and the NE); 
the second consists of three members (FR, the UK, and IR); the third consists again of three 
members (IT, FI, and SE); and the fourth consists of just one member (BE). It is noteworthy 
that, except from FR, all the leading producers in the EU (ES, DE, the NE, and DK) belong to 
the  same  club.  The  existence  multiple  price  clubs  implies  that  the  EU  market  for  that 
commodity is not a single one.     
  Table 4 presents the aggregation history of the clustering algorithm in the search for 
pork price clubs where the strong version of the LOP holds. As noted above, the search is 
now restricted within price clubs where the weak version of the LOP holds. Within the fist 
such club there are four clubs; one consists of three members (DE, AT, and ES), another 
consists of two members (DK, and the NE), while GR and PT are single-membered clubs. 
Within the second such club, there are two clubs; one with two members (FR and UK) and 
another with one member (IR). Within the third such club there are again two clubs; one with 
two members (FI and SE) and another with one member IT.  
Proximity  of  localized  markets  is  thought  to  be  an  important  factor  for  the  LOP 
(strong version). The cost of transporting goods to neighboring countries is lower compared to 
that of transporting goods to more distant ones. Also, preferences in neighboring countries are 
likely to be similar (it is known that, with few exceptions, North-Central Europe opts for 
heavy pork carcasses, whereas Southern Europe opts for lighter animals).  The notion that 
proximity plays a role in the LOP is only partially supported by the empirical results. DE and 
AT are adjacent markets and the same is true for FI and SE; the UK and FR (though not 
literary adjacent) are not far away from each other. However, PT does not belong to the same 
club with ES, and IR does not belong to the same club with the UK. With regard to the 
algorithm’s performance, note that the endogenously selected price clubs (strong version of 
                                                 
3 For stationary series which do not exhibit linear deterministic trends (like those of poultry prices in GR, SE, 
and the UK) there is no need to test for the weak version of the LOP because such series hold (on average) 
proportional relationships.  
4 All tests have been carried out using the PcGive 10 program.   




the LOP) are largely consistent with the average prices reported in Table 1. For example, 
while the average prices in ES and in DE differ by less than 2 Euros, the average prices in ES 
and in PT differ by more than 5 Euros or the average prices in IR and in the UK differ by 
almost 16 Euros. Therefore, the clustering algorithm seems that has captured the situation on 
the ground rather well.  
Table 5 presents the aggregation history of the clustering algorithm in search for 
poultry price clubs where the weak version of the LOP holds. There are 6 such clubs. The first 
consists of four members (DE, ES, DK, and the NE); the second consists of three members 
(BE, FR, and IT); the third consists again of three members (GR, SE, and the UK) (the 
localized markets with the I(0) price series); AT, FI, IR, and PT are clubs with one member. It 
appears that the EU poultry market is even more fragmented than the pork market. A possible 
reason for this may be the larger heterogeneity of poultry relative to pork and the preference 
of consumers for poultry produced by national firms.  
Table  6  presents  the  aggregation  history  of  the  clustering  algorithm  in  search  for  
poultry price clubs where the strong version of the LOP holds. The search is again restricted 
within price clubs where the weak version of the LOP holds. Within the first such club there 
are three clubs; one with two members (ES, and DK) and two with a single member (DE) and 
(NE). FR, IT, and BE form a price club on the basis of the strong version of the LOP as well. 
This, however, is not true for any pair of the three I(0) price series. FR and IT and FR and BE 
are adjacent countries which provides some support for the argument that proximity plays a 
role in the strong version of the LOP. The clustering algorithm again is largely consistent with 
the real world data given that the differences in average prices between DK and ES on the one 
hand and FR and  IT and BE and  IT on the other are among the lowest in the 14 series 
considered.  
 
            
5. Conclusions  
  The functioning of geographically separated markets has been a long-standing concern 
for the EU policy makers and the focus of intense public debate. The EU Commission in the 
context of the Internal Market Strategy has reinforced the monitoring and benchmarking of 
price  differences.  Formal  research  on  spatial  price  relationships,  however,  is  scarce.  The 
present  study  investigates  the  price  dynamics  of  two  agricultural  commodities,  pork  and 
poultry, in order to determine whether there is a single or multiple markets within the EU. The 
investigation relies on the notion of a price club (meaning a group of countries in which prices 
obey the LOP) and on a clustering algorithm which allows for endogenous selection of such 
clubs.      
  Overall, the empirical results indicate that the EU market for pork and poultry are far 
from the ideal one in which prices are uniform. This is quite disconcerting for at least three 
reasons. First, the EU policymakers traditionally have intervened less in the pork and the 
poultry markets relative to those of other livestock products such as beef meat, lamb meet, 
and milk. The rather limited intervention creates a favorable environment for a smooth price 
transmission process across space. Second, since the early 1990s agricultural sector-specific 
measures  have  been  taken  to  remove  institutional  barriers  to  intra-Community  trade. 
Specifically,  the  Monetary  Compensatory  Amounts  (MCAs)  which  acted  as  export 
subsidies/taxes were eliminated in 1992. Non-tariff barriers in the form of sanitary restrictions 
have been dealt with through the “mutual recognition principle”, whereby products acceptable 
for sale in one member state must be accepted in another as well. Third, the completion of the 
Single  Market  and  the  establishment  of  the  EMU  has  been  expected  to  facilitate  price 




  At the microeconomic level, a number of factors may play a role in preventing the 
LOP to hold. The most important among them can be: a) collusive behavior as a channel of 
business strategy which is facilitated by vertical or horizontal integration. Both the pork and 
the  poultry  industry  in  the  EU  are  characterized  by  high  and  increasing  levels  of 
concentration; b) market segmentation based on national consumption habits/preferences or 
created  by  firms  proactively  though  product  differentiation.  As  far  as  preferences  are 
concerned Northern Europe opts for heavy pork carcasses, whereas Southern Europe opts for 
lighter  animals.  With  regard  to  product  differentiation,  competition  in  the  poultry  market 
(even  at  national  level)  largely  takes  place  among  few  firms  with  well  established  brand 
names  and  company  images.  This  may  allow  national  firms  to  charge  premiums 
(“psychological prices”) on their products. 
  The time series approach adopted in this work is one among a number of potential 
avenues for investigating spatial price relationships and market integration. Future empirical 
studies may utilize the notion of σ-convergence (that means, tendency of price inequality to 
decrease with time) or may opt to analyze the dynamics of the cross-section distribution of 
prices focusing on other potentially interesting phenomena such as persistence, switching, and 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of the Pork Price Series 
 
Country  Average   Standard 
Deviation 
Country  Average   Standard 
Deviation 
AT  145.22  24.03  GR  168.68  28.00 
BE  138.91  24.51  IR  130.86  15.97 
DE  145.25  24.30  IT  154.91  21.61 
DK  128.25  20.25  NE  126.61  22.59 
ES  143.33  24.51  PT  149.53  24.86 
FI  136.30  12.63  SE  136.10  14.53 




Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of the Poultry Price Series 
Country  Average   Standard 
Deviation 
Country  Average   Standard 
Deviation 
AT  164.18  26.49  GR  173.94  25.52 
BE  142.19  25.76  IR  155.96  31.56 
DE  151.25  24.78  IT  146.88  27.79 
DK  139.21  22.91  NE  131.25  22.95 
ES  134.68  32.81  PT  145.39  30.62 
FI  165.22  31.07  SE  159.34  22.81 




























Table 3. Search for Clubs Where the Weak Version of the LOP Holds: 
Aggregation History of the Algorithm for Pork 
 
Iteration  Clubs  l C   p-value 
1  [DK][PT]  0.866 
2  [ 1 C ][DE]  0.941 
3  [ 2 C ][ES]  0.923 
4  [ 3 C ][AT]  0.849 
5  [ 4 C ][GR]  0.829 
6  [ 5 C ][NE]  0.822 
7  [FR][UK]  0.755 
8  [ 7 C ][IR]  0.813 
9  [IT][FI]  0.652 
10  [ 9 C ][SE]  0.387 
 
 
Table 4. Search for Clubs Where the Strong Version of the LOP Holds: 
Aggregation History of the Algorithm for Pork 
 
Club where the weak 
version of the LOP 
holds 
     
1st  
(DK,  PT,  DE,  ES, 




Clubs  l C  
 
p-value 
1  [DE][AT]  0.565 
2  [ 1 C ][ES]  0.194 
 
3  [DK][NE]  0.179 
2
nd  




Clubs  l C  
 
p-value 
  1  [FR][UK]  0.105 
3rd 




Clubs  l C  
 
p-value 
















Table 5. Search for Clubs Where the Weak Version of the LOP Holds: 
Aggregation History of the Algorithm for Poultry 
 
Iteration  Clubs  l C   p-value 
1  [DE][ES]  0.884 
2  [ 1 C ][DK]  0.917 
3  [BE][FR]  0.552 
4  [ 2 C ][NE]  0.444 
5  [ 3 C ][IT]  0.285 
 
Table 6. Search for Clubs Where the Stong Version of the LOP Holds: 
Aggregation History of the Algorithm for Poultry 
 
 
Club where the weak 
version of the LOP 
holds 
     
1st  




Clubs  l C  
 
p-value 
  1  [ES][DK]  0.854 
2nd  




Clubs  l C  
 
p-value 
  1  [FR][IT]  0.215 
  2  [ 1 C ][BE]  0.213 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 